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This memorandum is only a preliminary examination of 
peacekeeping force options in Rwanda. Its purpose is to serve 
as a basis for further discussion and analysis. The stated 
costs for each option are rough estimates only, and assume 
reimbursement of OAU forces at UN rates. 
Background. The Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) are soon expected to sign peace accords 
ending nearly three years of civil war in that central African 
country. The proposed peace agreement calls for a "Neutral 
International Force" (NIF) to act as a peacekeeping force· 
during the transitional period. The actual size of the NIF 
will be dependent on the outcome of a planning survey; current 
estimates among Arusha participants range up to 2,500 
·personnel. The costs of the NIF will largely depend on the 
ultimate size of the force. 
The NIF's mandate will include supervision of the 
encampment and disarming of combatant forces, supervision of 
the demobilization of excess mil;tary forces, monitoring of the 
integration of forces into the new·national army and 
gendarmerie, and monitoring of internal security to permit the 
return of up to 1.5 million displaced persons and refugees. 
The NIF's geographic span of control will encompass the 
entirety of Rwanda (10;169 square mlles, approximately'the size 
of Maryland). NtF peacekeepers would be required for · 
approximately 10-12 months, while observers could expect to 
remain in Rwanda for the 22 month transition. 
The Rwandan Government, the RPF, and the Organizat.ion of 
African Unity have all indicated that they look to the United 
Nations to provide the NIF peacekeeping force. The Rwandan 
Government has also indicated that "the people" need to see 
non-African particip~tion in the peacekeeping force and has 
made clear that it does not trust the OAU, which it regards as 
pro-RPF. 
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There are currently SO OAU Neutral Military Observer Group 
(NMOG) monitors in Rwanda acting as an interpositional force in 
the buffer zone; The'NMOG may be expanded to a force of 240 
personnel in the near future, but its essential mandate is not 
expected to change. NMOG is charged with·monitoring of 
military activities by the two sides to ensure that they do not 
conduGt offensive military activities, reinforce forward units, 
or move additional weapons or munitions in the vicinity of the 
neutral buffer zone. 
Options. Six options are currently being considered for a 
peacekeeping force for Rwanda: 
Option 1 - UN-only Peacekeeping Operation. (O~U personnel 
could form an important part of a UN force, both numerically 
and Jn command positions.) 
Force·composed of approximately 2500 peacekeepers would cost 
approximately $2.5 million per month in reimbursable salaries, 
.Plus $375,000 per month in operating costs, plus an estimated 
· $3 million in round-trip transport costs, or about $37.5 
million for one year. If a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda 
were conducted on an assessed basis, the estimated cost to the 
u.s. would be roughly $11 million for one year. · 
• Advantages: 
- The only force trusted by all parties 
- The UN is the most experienced international p~ac~keeping 
organization 
- Has a PKO planning and management directorate within the 
Secretariat 
- Burea~cratic f~~ding mechanisms ex~st to finance UN 
peacekeeping operations' (both within· USG and other countries) 
- Could provide an easy, needed success to UN peacekeeping 
efforts · · 
- Canada, among others, has reportedly informall¥ indicated 
a willingness to provide troops for an UN operation in Rwanda 
-Would satisfy UN SYG Boutros-Ghali's earlier insistence 
that if'the UN were involved in an operation, it must be in 
command of the entire operation 
- Would. allow France to withdraw its troops from Kigali 
(approximately 350 soldiers to ensure the security of the 









- Might allow training of OAU Secretariat personnel through 
seconding them to the UN operation as deputies 
- A UN PKO is cost effective when compared to the cost of 
caring for the displaced population. A successful PKO would 
allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly 
reducing current humanitarian relief costs (estimated at $100 
million t~is year, with the u.s. pledged to contribute over $34 
million) and obviating the need for future relief. 
- Supports USG policy (per PRD-13) of emphasizing the UN as 
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- ~ussia (and possibly UK) may oppose and possibly veto an 
assessed UN operation due to financial constraints {neith~r 
contributes significantly to the humani~arian aid bill) 
- Finding enough contributions for a voluntary UN operation 
would be problematic 
- UN peacekeeping management directorate is already 
·· stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN 
peacekeeping efforts worldwide 
- May prove difficult to find enough states willing to 
provide military forces to participate in the operation 
- UN peacekeepers could not be in place and operational for 
an estimated 4-6 months 
- DoD does not want to risk having to provide its own 
resources, as might be required by a UN operation . 
- Ig~ores USG. policy to promote regional peacekeeping 
institutions 
Option 2 - OAU-only Peacekeeping Operation 
.An OAU force composed of approximately 2500 persqnnel, 
operating independently of the UN, could be expected to cost 
the international community at least the same amount as a UN 
operati'on (approximately $2.5 million per. month reimbursed to 
donating countries plus $375,000 per month in operating costs), 
as it is unlikely·that African countries will be willing to 
provide significant numbers of military troops to the OAU on a 
continuing basis without being reimbursed at UN rates. Cost 
for a one year operation, including estimated round-trip 
transport costs of $3 million, would be $37.5 million. 
• Advantages: 
- Avoids adding another peacekeeping operation to the 








- Avoids risking Russian Security Council opposition 
- If the operation succeeded, it would,provide a confidence 
building experience to the OAU as an international institution 
- Would demonstrate that the OAU and its member states are 
serious about taking responsibility for. solving Africa's 
problems· · 
- Supports USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping 
institutions (although a~ perhaps too rapid a pace) 
- The Rwandan Government thinks the NMOG is pro-RPF and 
therefore it opposes an OAU-only force 
- The OAU SYG Salim Salim has stated that the OAU will not 
undertake a peacekeeping mission 
- African states will need massive external assistance 
(materiel; transportation, and possibly training) before they 
could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation 
- The OAU lacks experience in planning large peacekeeping 
·· efforts · 
- The OAU Secretariat is not staffed to supervise/manage 
major peacekeeping operations . 
- The OAU lacks the communications equipment required to 
manage such an operation (Satcom communications, HF radios) 
- The OAU is severely resource-constrained and lacks 
funding mecha~isms to support such a major endeavor; funding 
would be ad hoc, on a bilateral and uncertain basis 
- May well lead to a collapse of the peace in Rwanda 
Option 3 - Hybrid UN-OAU Peacekeeping Operation (UN Observer 
Fotce and OAU Peacekeeping Force) 
Estimated costs to the international community of approximately 
$3 million per month (70 UN observers at a per diem rate of 
$120 per day ~quals $252,000; 2400 peacekeepers reimbursed at 
approximately $2.4 million per mo·nth, plus $375,000 per month 
for operating costs), plus estimated round-trip transport of $3 
million. Estimated cost for a one year operation would be $39 
million. 
• Advantages: 
- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the 
Rwandan peacekeeping operation 
- A small number of UN observers could probably be deployed 
more quickly than a full UN peacekeeping operation, and at 






- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU 
- Might minimize Russian opposition (especially if it is 
conducted as a voluntary rather than an assessed operation) 
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning 
experience and possible peacekeeping success 
- Active UN involvement, and participation of non-African 
observers, would probably make this acceptable to both Rwandan 
parties 
- UN invo.lvetnent would provide a face saving way for the 
French to withdraw thei~ forc~s from Rwanda 
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- Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional 
peacekeeping institutions 
• Disadvantages: 
- Might not be trusted by the Government of Rwanda 
-·The UN has indicated to the OAU that if the UN were 
involved in a peacekeeping operation, the UN must be in command 
, . of the entire operation 
- 6AU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not 
support the concept of a "dual command," and would defer to 
the UN for operational command. 
- African states will need massive external assistance 
(materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they 
could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation 
-The OAU is not currently·staffed to manage a large 
peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping 
directorate) 
- The OAU Headquarters lacks the communications equipment 
necessary to·manage a major peacekeeping operation in Rwanda 
Option 4 - Hybrid UN-OAU-Franco-Belgian Force 
Combined forces would consist of a 750 man OAU force in the 
· buffer zone augmented bY· 250 uN· t·roops·, paid for .through· a 
voluntary fund; retention of the 81 man UN force on the 
Uganda-Rwanda border which is paid through UN assessments; and 
an 800 man "International Force~ consisting·of one Belgian and 
one French battalion whose costs would be borne directly by the 
.contrib~tors. The costs to.the int~rnational community would 
be approximately $1.1 million per month in reimbursable 
salaries (for UN and OAU forces), $225,000 in operating costs 
per month, and·$1.2 million in U~ and OAU round-trip transport, 
for an estimated total of $17.1 million for a one year 
operation. (Note - this option has a total of 1881 personnel 








-Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the· 
Rwandan peacekeeping operation 
-Requires a greatly reduced manpower.requirement on the 
United Nations (331 peacekeepers versus up to 2500 peacekeepers) 
- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU 
- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to support the UN, 
which ~ould serve as a 90ndui~ to provide funding for the 
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- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning · 
experience and a probable peacekeeping success 
- Active UN involvement and participation of non-African 
observers would probably make this acceptable to the Government 
of Rwanda · 
- Supports USG policy goa~ of promoting regional 
peacekeeping institutions 
• Disadvantages: 
- would probably be rejected by the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front, which considers France an ally of the Government 
- France and Belgium might object on fiscal grounds 
- France has indicated that it cannot provide voluntary 
contributions to UN peacekeeping operations 
-France has indicated its. desire to withdraw· its troops 
from Rwanda 
- Belgium has expressed its reluctance to contribute troops 
to a Rwandan peacekeeping operation due to its colonial 
association with Rwanda · 
- African states will need massive external assistance 
(materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they 
could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation 
- The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large 
peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping 
directorate) · . . 
-The OAU might object to the bilateral aspect.of the 
Franco-Belgian force participating in the operation 
- The OAU has been reluctant to accept the pea9ekeeping role 
- OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not 
support the concept of a "dual comliland" 
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Option S - Small UN NIF in Kigali/Expanded NMOG in DMZ 
Two separate forces: A ·small UN force of about 300 men to 
assure security in Kigali for the installation of the joint 
transitional government and an expanded NMOG of about 240 men 
with a broader mandate to act as an effective buffer force and 
provide security in the DMZ. The total cost is estimated at 
$620,000 per- month, plus round-trip transport of approxima~ely 
$725,000, or roughly $8.millipn per year. 
Is roughly one-fifth the cost of the other force options 
actively being considered 
Would allow the post-peace coalition transitional 
government to begin-functioning. If the coalition government 
works out~ the parties• confidence may be high enough to allow 
force integration without additional deployment of peacekeepers. 
Does not require any command relationship between the UN 
·· and OAU, thereby avoiding the bureaucratic resistance of-both 
organizations. 
An expanded NMOG could provide the security necessary 
for holding of local joint elections in the DMZ and for a 
·gradual return of the displaced to their homes. 
Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the 
Rwandan PKO, thereby significantly boosting confi~ence levels 
Could probably be deployed more quickly that a 
full-scale UN PKO 
Requires far less manpower from the UN 
The small UN force on the ground could evaluate the need 
for a larger force for the cantonment/disarmament/force 
integration/demobilization stage of the PKO 
Would allow the OAU to consult with the UN force and 
benefit from its PKO expertise 
Would probably minimize Russian opposition· (particularly 
if conducted as a voluntary operation) 
· Active UN involvement and participation of .non~African · 
forces would make this option more acceptable to the Rwandan 
government. 
UN involvement would provide a face-saving way for the 
French to withd~aw their forces, as the RPF has demanded. 
Would demonstrate the OAU•s acceptance of responsibility 
for addressing Africa's problems. 
Advances the USG's goal of promoting regional PKOs 
Canada, among others, has informally indi.cated a 
willingness to provide troops for a UN PKO ·in Rwanda 
Despite the OAU's limited PKO experience, they may have 









Deployme~t of additional peacekeeping forces sometime in 
the future might well be required to complete the cantonment/ 
disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage. 
The OAU may not have the funding on hand to expand the 
NMOG and, if additional funding is reguired, it would have to 
be on an ad hoc, bilateral ·basis. · 
Even for an operation t-his small, funding of the UN 
~-~~-~~9~~~:~~·~=t=:~~Th~~:~~---
one country in a UN force this small, and it could prove 
difficult to find one country willing to accept the 
responsibility of contributing all 300 UN troops. 
The UN peacekeeping management directorate is already 
stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN 
PKOs 
Optioq 6 - Conduct No International Peacekeeping Operation: 
There would be no cost to the international community for 
peacekeepers or observers, but humanitarian aid costs would 
probably continue at or above current high levels (at least 
$100 million this year, with the USG pledged to provide $34 
million in humanitarian aid). 
• Advantage: 
- Reduces peacekeeping costs to international community 
• Disadvantages: 
- Will perpetuate massive relief costs, which in Rwanda are 
approximately 3 times higher than the cost of a 2500-man PKO 
- Will most likely lead to the collapse of the peace in 
Rwanda-, which risks regional destabilization 
- International inaction would highlight the 
marginalization of Africa 
- Would set a bad precedent; other countries in conflict 
might prove un~illing to accept a negotiated settlement if the 
international community is unwilling to provide peacekeeping 
support 
· - Ignores USG policy goals of conflict ~esolution and 
democratization (in Rwanda, the latter is wholly dependent on a 
successful end to the civil war) · 
- Nullifies the US investment in resolution of the Rwandan 
civil war, including more than one year of diplomatic effort 
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